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Congress as Reluctant Regulator:
Hazardous Waste Policy in the 1980's
James J. Floriot
In the 1970's Congress established an environmental protection regula-
tory system by passing laws which, like many preceding regulatory stat-
utes, set relatively broad goals and timetables and left substantial discre-
tion to the implementing agency on how best to achieve those goals. As
demonstrated in the recent reauthorizations of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA)' and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),2 however, Con-
gress is no longer confident that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA)' will exercise such discretion as intended by Congress. As a result,
Congress itself has had to assume the role of regulator, making some of
the detailed technical and administrative determinations typically left to
the implementing agency. Instead of authorizing EPA to regulate the dis-
posal of chemical wastes, Congress has prescribed the limits. Instead of
relying on EPA to meet deadlines, Congress has established self-enforcing
standards to be implemented in the absence of agency action. Instead of
allowing EPA to establish technical standards of safety, Congress has set
minimum requirements that EPA may not reduce.
t United States Representative for the First District of New Jersey, and Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism, which has jurisdiction over hazardous
waste issues. The author wishes to express his thanks for assistance in the preparation of this article
to Gregory E. Lawler, Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee, and William Roberts and Rena Steinzor,
Counsels to the Subcommittee.
1. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911-6916, 6921-6931, 6941-6949, 6951-6954,
6961-6964, 6971-6979, 6981-6986 (1982)); amended by Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of
1980, Pub. L. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991(i)); and Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, Title 1, 98 Stat. 3224 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6924).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§
4041, 4611-4612, 4661-4662, 4681-4682 (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1982); 49 U.S.C. § 11901
(1982)). CERCLA is commonly known as "Superfund."
3. EPA was created in 1970 to handle the rash of environmental legislation enacted during the
1960's. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, PuB. PAPERS: RICHARD NIXON 578-87 (1970). In its creation,
EPA was a hybrid, inheriting specific responsibilities from the Federal Water Quality Administration,
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Despite this patchwork of authority, EPA has, until recently, been regarded as a
strong advocate for environmental protection.
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Congress was provoked into assuming this new .regulatory role by a
recalcitrant EPA which was fulfilling the current Administration's objec-
tive of environmental deregulation." In line with the philosophy of the
Reagan Administration, EPA has consistently refused to carry out the
congressional intent expressed in its organic statutes. Against this, the
traditional tools of Congressional oversight have proven ineffective. Con-
gress, at least in part inspired by strong public opinion,5 has repeatedly
criticized EPA's failure to enforce laws and questioned the appointed offi-
cials' commitment to such enforcement.' Under most administrations,
political criticism and strong public opinion would return regulatory pol-
icy to a sensible middle ground. In the 1980's, however, EPA and the
Administration have argued that the federal government need not pursue
environmental protection, while Congress meanwhile focused its debates
on how to ensure it. In the debate over RCRA and Superfund legislation,
the validity of the fundamental goal of environmental protection has itself
become the matter of dispute between the Administration and Congress.
This article explores the atypical situation in which Congress takes over
as regulator due to the politically motivated refusal of an executive branch
agency, namely EPA, to act responsibly. Regulatory theorists have long
concerned themselves with the structural failures of administrative agen-
cies, such as chronic inefficiency' and the agencies' susceptibility to
4. Two examples illustrate the ongoing conflict between the Reagan Administration and Congress
over expanding existing environmental statutes. The Administration's position on reforming the Clean
Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982), was criticized in 1981 as a "sugar-coated prescription
for dirty, unhealthy air" by environmentalists and as "dangerous retreat" by Members of Congress.
37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 507 (1981). Similarly, the 1984 attempt to reauthorize the Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(0-300(0) (1982), which would have put teeth into a dormant program,
was opposed by the Reagan Administration because it would have expanded federal involvement. 40
CONG. Q. ALMANAC. See J. LASH, K. GILLMAN, AND D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984).
5. In September 1981, the New York Times/CBS News Poll published survey results which
indicated that Americans cared deeply about protecting the environment. Sixty-seven percent did not
favor the relaxation of environmental laws in order to achieve economic growth. Forty-five percent
held protection of the environment to be such an important goal that the requirements and standards
could not be too high, regardless of the cost. The results of these and other related polls are summa-
rized in THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1982 424-29 (1982).
6. In considering amendments to RCRA, for example, many members of Congress questioned
EPA's commitment to enforce existing provisions of law when no personnel or resources were being
devoted by the Agency to implement them. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Reauthoriza-
tion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 424-25 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982
House RCRA Hearings].
7. Conflicts between the Administration and Congress over CERCLA are described in detail in
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COM-
MERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER EPA DOCUMENTS, ABUSES
IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, AND OTHER MATTERS 121-57 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited
as OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
8. See, e.g., R. LITAN & D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 81-99 (1983).
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capture by the industries they regulate.9 Congressional dissatisfaction with
EPA stems not from structural problems, but from political recalcitrance
on the Agency's part. The problems created by such inter-branch political
standoffs are exacerbated by the common practice of delegating broad au-
thority to the administrative agencies, a practice which has presumed a
general consensus between legislators and the executive agency staff on
policy goals. The present conflict between Congress and EPA dramati-
cally illustrates how the executive branch, acting through the administra-
tive agencies, can virtually emasculate statutes through strategic inaction.
This article examines Congress as regulator in the context of the
reauthorization of RCRA in 1984 and the current proposals for
reauthorizing Superfund. Part I reviews the legislative history of the orig-
inal RCRA and CERCLA acts. Part II describes EPA's implementation,
or, more precisely, non-implementation, of these hazardous waste laws.
The congressional reaction to this regulatory failure, culminating in the
drastic limitation of agency discretion in the reauthorized versions of
RCRA and CERCLA, is discussed in Part III. Part IV analyzes the fac-
tors that pushed Congress to adopt the regulatory role, discusses the
advantages and failings of Congress as rulemaker, and offers broad guide-
lines for determining when such Congressional behavior is most
appropriate.
I. Congress Delegates to EPA
RCRA and CERCLA are the two federal laws designed to deal with
hazardous waste. RCRA established a regulatory system covering the gen-
eration, transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste, while
CERCLA created and funded a federal program to clean up abandoned
hazardous waste disposal sites.
A. The Passage of RCRA
Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the first
federal effort to control the disposal of hazardous waste, in 1976, before
the extent and danger of hazardous waste disposal problems became
widely known. RCRA created a "cradle to grave" regulatory system for
hazardous waste, requiring generators, transporters, and disposers to
maintain written records of waste transfers, and establishing standards,
procedures, and permit requirements for disposal."
9. See, e.g., Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 6 (1974).
10. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6924 (1976).
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As in most other federal regulatory statutes, including other environ-
mental laws, Congress prescribed goals in broad terms only: what was to
be achieved by EPA and when. For example, EPA was directed to
develop standards within eighteen months for facilities disposing of haz-
ardous waste11 and to include provisions for record-keeping; 12 treatment,
storage, and disposal methods; 8 requirements for location, design, and
construction;14 contingency plans for accidents;1" and financial responsibil-
ity requirements. 6 The only substantive direction was a requirement that
the EPA regulations protect "health and the environment."1 "
Although the task given to EPA was enormously complex-perhaps
more complex than anyone, including Congress, understood at the
time-the delegation of enormous discretion to EPA was sensible. Pre-
scribing standards for hazardous waste disposal required careful analysis
of scientific and economic data and a thorough understanding of the com-
mercial system for hazardous waste disposal. In 1976 the information and
analysis necessary for sound formulation of the regulatory details were
simply not available to Congress, although enough was known to indicate
that considerable hazards did exist.
In our scheme of government the role of an environmental regulatory
agency is to act as the scientific and technical expert in filling in the de-
tails of the environmental protection policy enunciated by Congress. Only
an executive branch agency possessing sufficient technical expertise,
administrative skills, and bureaucratic resources can administer a nation-
wide regimen for controlling the disposal of hazardous waste. Soon after
the enactment of RCRA, EPA learned that the development of hazardous
waste regulations would be an enormously difficult task. The complexity
of the technical issues involved in determining disposal methods appropri-
ate to the thousands of different chemicals and other wastes, each present-
ing different dangers," was compounded by the enormous economic
impact of controlling the high volume of hazardous waste produced in this
11. Id. § 6921(a).
12. Id. § 6924(1).
13. Id. § 6924(3).
14. Id. § 6924(4).
15. Id. § 6924(5).
16. Id. § 6924(6).
17. Id. § 6924.
18. The difficulty of assessing the appropriate disposal method for different types of chemicals is
discussed in OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATE-
GIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL 156-218 (1983) [hereinafter cited as OTA REPORT]. For
example, appropriate disposal methods vary with the underlying geology of an area. Id. at 182. See
also V. PYE, R. PATRICK, & J. QUARLES, GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 15-19 (1983).
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country. 1 In the developmental stage of this regulatory system, EPA, like
any bureaucracy in a similar situation, moved slowly.
B. The Birth of Superfund
As Congress and the Administration learned more about past hazardous
waste disposal practices and their effect on the environment, they soon
realized that the country faced an environmental crisis.'0 Sparked by epi-
sodes such as the catastrophes at Love Canal' and Kentucky's "Valley of
the Drums,"'.. Congress recognized that, aside from the regulatory
problems addressed in RCRA, a remedial program was needed to clean
up existing hazardous waste dumps. Improper hazardous waste disposal
had poisoned the land and water of thousands of communities across the
country.' 8 In community after community, officials discovered sites where
chemical wastes had been dumped in the ground for years, or even
decades.' The sites were simply abandoned, and in many cases the own-
ers had disappeared. No one took responsibility for these abandoned sites,
and the local, state, and federal governments had neither the legal author-
ity nor the resources to clean them up.
The federal response to this crisis was to assume responsibility for the
cleanup of the worst sites. The 96th Congress, during the last days of the
Carter Administration, enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act.' 5 CERCLA's program had two
major components. First, the law established a $1.6 billion trust fund, to
be funded over a period of five years primarily by taxes on the domestic
production and import of chemical "feedstocks"-the basic chemical
building blocks that are used to manufacture most other chemical
19. It has been estimated that about 255 to 275 million metric tons of hazardous waste are gener-
ated annually. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 3. By 1990 an estimated $12 billion per year will be
spent to manage such waste. Id. at 5.
20. An EPA study indicated that there were 80,263 sites in the nation with contaminated pits,
ponds, and lagoons. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 5. In addition, EPA also identified, as part of
the Superfund program, 418 uncontrolled hazardous waste sites which needed priority attention.
Three hundred and forty-seven of those sites were determined to pose direct threats to drinking water
supplies and were thought to cause birth defects, cancer, and other diseases. Wash. Post, Dec. 21,
1982, at A2, col. 1.
21. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1978, at A3, col. 1. See also L. GIBBS, LOVE CANAL-MY STORY
(1982).
22. Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1979, at A2; N.Y. Times, July 11, 1980, at B4, col. 5.
23. See generally M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY Toxic CHEMI-
CALS (1979).
24. EPA estimated that 150 million metric tons of hazardous wastes were being dumped annually,
while the Office of Technology Assessment estimated approximately 250 to 275 million tons per year.
W. DRAYTON, AMERICA'S TOXIC PROTECTION GAP, THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
NATION'S TOXIcS LAWS 50 (1984).
25. See supra note 2.
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products." The fund was to be used to clean up sites that presented im-
mediate public health and environmental hazards and for which judg-
ments against the private responsible parties could not be obtained. The
expectation was that the federal government would clean up several hun-
dred of the worst sites in a cooperative effort with the states, but that
thousands of remaining sites would be left for the states to clean up. Sec-
ond, CERCLA established liability for the private parties who generated
the wastes found at a dump site, those who transported such wastes, and
those who owned and operated the dump. 7 These liability provisions held
such parties strictly, jointly and severally liable"8 for the costs of cleaning
up the site 2  and permitted the federal government both to recover the
funds expended by the federal fund 80 and to issue orders compelling pri-
vate responsible parties to conduct such cleanups on their own.81
Within these basic parameters CERCLA gave EPA virtually unlimited
discretion in carrying out its provisions.82 For example, the statute's cen-
tral cleanup provision gave the agency open-ended authority to respond to
a release or threatened release of any "hazardous substance, pollutant or
contaminant" that "may present an imminent and substantial danger to
the public health."8 Each of these key terms was defined in the broadest
possible manner. 4
Some opponents of the original legislation warned that the broad
definitions and administrative discretion would lead to excessive activity
26. Hazardous Substances Response Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, tit. II, § 221, 94
Stat. 2796, 2801 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982)). The chemical feedstocks include crude
oil and petroleum products, id., 94 Stat. at 2797 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4611 (1982)), and 42
specified chemicals, id., 94 Stat. at 2799 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4661).
27. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
28. CERCLA does not directly establish a culpability standard; however, all courts which have
addressed the issue have interpreted § 107 to impose strict liability, See, e.g., South Carolina
Recycling, 14 ENVT'L. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20722 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984), and several have
extended strict liability to § 106 cases; see, e.g., United States v. Price, 13 ENVT'L L. REP. (ENVTL.
L. INST.) 20843 (D.N.J. July 28, 1983). Although the issue has not been conceded by waste genera-
tors, the court decisions to date have concluded that responsible parties are jointly and severally liable
unless they prove a basis for allocation. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENVT'L L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20385
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 1984). See also Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste
Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 260 (1981).
29. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1982).
30. Id.
31. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). Sections 9606-9607 specifically give the President
authority to issue orders to do what he deems necessary in the situation.
32. Id. §§ 9606, 9607. The statute conferred on the President all authority to expand the trust
fund and enforce its liability provisions. The President subsequently delegated most of these decisions
to the EPA Administrator.
33. Id. § 9604(a)(1)(B).
34. For example, the term "release" is defined, with a few limiting exceptions, as "any spilling,
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment..." Id. § 9601(22).
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and overregulation by the bureaucracy. Congressman David Stockman
warned of an "undirected regulatory blunderbuss":
The bill prescribes drastic overkill and resource waste in three
separate dimensions: inventory requirements, monitoring, and
clean-up. . . . [C]lean-up methods and costs are wide open and au-
thority to order and directly fund cleanup is plenary, rather than
limited to cases of imminent threat to public health. 5
Senator Jesse Helms, the most active critic of the Senate version-of the
legislation, also protested:
[W]e are going far beyond what is needed to address the real prob-
lem-that of abandoned waste sites. I am concerned that the addition
of this whole "release" concept will unnecessarily open the
"Pandora's box" of new regulations and notice requirements-re-
quirements which will not assist in the cost-effective cleanup of
waste sites but that will in addition merely provide jobs for more
bureaucrats at the expense of the consumers of America."
In spite of these criticisms, Congress did set ambitious goals and dele-
gate substantial authority to EPA to design a program to implement these
goals. Notwithstanding the optimistic language of the statute, no one
expected a perfect agency response free of the false starts and delays nor-
mal to any bureaucratic undertaking. As the technical problems became
more difficult, EPA's progress slowed. As the economic impacts grew, the
outside pressure on EPA also rose, slowing the implementation process
even further. No one expected EPA to design programs that would please
every member of Congress or outside interest group. It was expected,
however, that EPA would make a good faith effort to achieve the goals set
out by CERCLA in a timely fashion. Congress anticipated that resulting
agency actions might emphasize problems that it had not previously been
aware of, or that EPA might even suggest that it needed new or different
authority to cope with the problems. What Congress did not foresee was
that EPA would intentionally ignore CERCLA's clear statutory goals and
decline to exercise the ample authority Congress provided to achieve them.
35. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTAIN-
MENT ACT OF 1980, H.R. REP. No. 1016, Pt. I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1980) (dissenting views of
Representatives Stockman and Loeffler). While Congressman Stockman was commenting on a version
of the legislation that was changed substantially prior to final passage, his observations are equally
relevant to the specific aspects of the final law that he identifies.
36. 126 CONG. REc. 30,972 (1980).
Yale Journal on Regulation
II. EPA Abuses Its Discretion
EPA's implementation of RCRA and CERCLA provides an excellent
example of how a recalcitrant agency can use the tools at its disposal to
undermine Congressional intent in the implementaion process. A brief
review of the regulatory history of the two statutes clearly demonstrates
that EPA actively resisted achievement of the specific goals established by
Congress.
A. RCRA
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to increase the safety of hazardous
waste disposal practices. Key provisions required EPA to develop stand-
ards for facilities handling hazardous waste, to establish a system of per-
mits for such facilities, and to determine the technology appropriate for
the disposal of particular wastes.8
Implementation of the RCRA program began during the Carter
Administration. The delays and false starts inherent in the initial imple-
mentation of most regulatory efforts were commonplace: EPA quickly fell
behind schedule in efforts to issue regulations for permits and standards
by the statutory deadlines as it discovered the complexity of the problem
and the decisions it faced. 8 EPA's pace under Carter prompted criticism,
but its underlying commitment to implementing the statute was not
challenged.
In 1981 the situation changed. EPA's nominal efforts to implement the
protective provisions of RCRA clearly reflected the Reagan Administra-
tion's antipathy for regulation by the federal government and its concern
for selection of the least expensive means to dispose of hazardous waste.
Indeed, the test at EPA was not whether a regulatory system met the
statutory prescription to protect the environment, but rather whether it
met the Administration's ideological regulatory standard. 9 Congress fully
37. The standards provision of RCRA was intended to require establishment of a comprehensive
system prescribing methods of disposal and design which would ensure that waste disposal facilities
were safe. It was linked with another provision which required EPA to develop regulations requiring
all owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities to have a permit. EPA would issue a permit to
an applicant if the agency determined that the facility had complied with the appropriate standards
and other requirements of the permit regulations. To give EPA time to develop standards and a
process for issuing permits, the law also provided for "interim status," which allowed firms to con-
tinue to operate if they simply notified EPA that they were in operation on the date of enactment. 42
U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1982).
38. For example, regulatory standards for generators, transporters, and disposal facilities which
were required to be promulgated within 18 months after enactment of RCRA in 1976 were never
issued during the four-year tenure of the Carter Administration. Nevertheless, the Carter EPA had
twice attempted to issue standards between 1976 and 1980. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
39. This philosophy was characterized by EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch as "doing more with
less." NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1983, at 21.
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expects agencies to exercise delegated discretion in a manner consistent
with the Executive's political ideology. Tension between legislative intent
and regulatory implementation is inevitable and expected. This tension is
usually resolved through a series of small compromises and skirmishes
between the legislative and executive branches, often effectuated through
Congressional oversight. In the case of EPA and RCRA, however, the
Administration's philosophy was more fundamentally at odds with the
statute. EPA's implementation of the Administration's philosophy actually
subverted the statutory goals by delaying statutorily required action and
ignoring technical and scientific information that indicated a need for
additional requirements.
Bureaucracies rarely implement regulations as quickly as Congress
would like. Certainly progress under RCRA was slow in the years of the
Carter Administration, and there was no reason to expect the pace to pick
up after Reagan took office. Normal bureaucratic delay and delay result-
ing from initiating a regulatory program are far different, however, from
a conscious political decision by the executive branch to avoid the imple-
mentation of a law.
The degree of delay undertaken by the Reagan Administration is best
illustrated by the example of the land disposal regulations. RCRA
required EPA to finish developing the standards and permit regulations
within eighteen months of enactment.4 Yet despite this statutory deadline,
EPA did not issue final standards for land disposal facilities until almost
six years after RCRA was enacted, four and one-half years after the
deadline. EPA first proposed uniform design standards for hazardous
waste disposal facilities in December 1978.41 Two years later, in October
1980, EPA considered using a site-specific risk assessment approach in-
stead of the uniform design standards because of criticisms of the latter."2
Thirty months after the initial proposal EPA proposed standards which
More generally, in the early days of his first term as president, Ronald Reagan quoted with favor
from Calvin Coolidge that "no plan of centralization has ever been adopted which did not result in
bureaucracy, tyranny, inflexibility, reaction and decline." PuB. PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN: 1981 at
466 (1982). The Office of Management and Budget was given great power to substantively review
regulations and constrain the regulatory process by President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12291, 3
C.F.R. § 127 (1982), and by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982). The review
process, which required EPA to submit all "major" proposed rules to OMB along with a "Regulatory
Impact Analysis" before a final rule could be issued, is described in Role of OMB in Regulation:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6924 (1976).
41. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,982 (1978).
42. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,816 (1980). This would have required EPA to evaluate the potential risks to
human health and the environment posed by a particular facility's location, design, construction, and
operation.
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incorporated the site-specific risk assessment approach."' Even then, how-
ever, EPA did not intend to promulgate its standards in final form until
the fall of 1983. It was only because of a court order" that EPA issued its
final standards for land disposal facilities in July 1982 to become effective
January 26, 1983."5
Promulgation of the long-delayed land disposal standards, however, did
little to improve the safety of hazardous waste disposal practices, primar-
ily because the regulations imposed no immediate requirements on land
disposal facilities. The standards EPA established applied only when a
facility sought a "final permit." Those operating under "interim permits"
were allowed to continue operating without regard to the newly issued
standards. Facilities were not required to submit final permit applications
unless EPA requested them to do so." Not surprisingly, EPA's progress
in calling for permits was exceedingly slow. 17 By delays in standard-
setting and permit review, EPA managed to postpone any effective change
in the treatment of hazardous waste under RCRA for years beyond the
time foreseen by Congress.
In addition to delaying implementation, EPA consistently ignored
important technical information if the information appeared to lead to ad-
ditional environmental regulation, and thus increase costs to industry.
This approach subverted the basic purposes of RCRA. EPA's insistence
on land disposal as a sensible environmental option is illustrative of this
43. Reproposal of Proposed Rule and Proposed Amendments to Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,126 (1981)
(codified in revised form in 40 C.F.R. §§ 122, 260, 264) (proposed Feb. 5, 1981). Due to the alleged
complexity of the issues involved, the agency provided an eight-month comment period during which
it issued a "supplemental notice of reproposed rulemaking" on May 26, 1981, seeking additional
comments on its proposal. Supplemental Notice of Reproposed Rulemaking, 46 Fed. Reg. 28,314
(1981).
44. On November 13, 1981, EPA was ordered "to promulgate regulations for existing hazardous
waste land disposal facilities on or before February 1, 1982." Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340,
341 (D.D.C. 1981). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this order in its
decision of July 15, 1982. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Gorsuch, 684 F.2d 1033
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
45. Interim Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,274 (1982). Even then EPA stated that the agency "has
promulgated today's regulations ahead of the schedule which the Agency had desired, in order to
comply with the D.C. Circuit's court order." Id. at 32,278.
46. See, e.g, 40 C.F.R. § 270.10(e)(4) (1983).
47. Not until early 1983 did EPA begin to call in land disposal permit applications, and even then
only slowly: by March 24, 1983, only 150 permits had been called in. The first completed applica-
tions were not due back until August or September 1983. Hazardous Waste Control and Enforce-
ment Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 351 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983
House RCRA Hearings]. By mid-1983 only one landfill had been issued a final permit and only 10
final permit decisions were planned for such facilities in fiscal year 1984. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, INSPECTION, ENFORCEMENT AND PERMITTING ACTIVITIES AT HAZARDOUS WASTE FACIL-
ITIES 18 (1983).
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technique.' EPA clung doggedly to the belief that land disposal"' was an
environmentally sound policy and was preferable to other disposal
methods, despite evidence that land disposal caused serious environmental
hazards 0 and despite the widespread recognition that effective and availa-
ble treatment alternatives existed."' For decades industry simply disposed
of chemical and other wastes in the ground, with minimal protections for
the environment. As evidence of the dangers created by such practices
mounted, certain improvements in landfill technology were added, such as
liners, caps, groundwater monitoring, and leachate collection systems to
meet the more demanding regulatory requirements. Safer, more advanced
forms of disposal, including incineration, neutralization, recycling, and
biological treatment, became increasingly available,"' but the price was
greater than that of simple land disposal.
In 1982, a letter from EPA Administrator Gorsuch stated that "land-
filling is the lowest risk option currently available for dealing with large
quantities of hazardous waste generated each year. It represents a com-
monsense alternative to the indiscriminate practices of the past.""3 When
asked in 1983 to reconcile the agency's policy favoring land disposal with
various reports detailing its hazards," EPA's Acting Assistant
48. Under RCRA, EPA was initially given complete responsibility to determine the technology
appropriate for the disposal of particular wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1976).
49. Land disposal involves burying wastes in excavations and requires a high degree of engineer-
ing to prevent contamination of the environment. Landfills are usually less expensive than other dis-
posal methods but they do not assure permanent containment of the hazardous waste. A good landfill
would include a liner and a system designed to collect possible leakages of waste. Problems involving
land disposal methods may not become apparent until long after the disposal facility is closed. THE
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES 21-22
(1983).
50. Indeed, 40 C.F.R. § 261.33 (1985) comprises a list of substances known by the EPA in 1980
to have been toxic waste hazards when discarded improperly. The list includes more than 500 hun-
dred substances then positively identified as hazardous. EPA itself has stated that "the regulation of
hazardous waste land disposal must proceed from the assumption that migration of hazardous wastes
and their constituents and by-products from a land disposal facility will inevitably occur." 46 Fed.
Reg. 11,128 (1981). Additionally, a report by the Office of Technology Assessment, published in
March 1983, indicated that, despite the inherent threat to the groundwater posed by land disposal, "as
much as 80 percent of federally regulated hazardous waste . . . are being placed in or on the land."
OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 5.
51. Bromm, EPA's New Land Disposal Standards, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
15027, 15031, (1982) identifies "several types of hazardous waste management processes" other than
land disposal. These include underground treatment and storage in tanks, thermal treatment other
than incineration, and chemical, physical, and biological processes.
52. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 158-97.
53. 1982 House RCRA Hearings, supra note 6, at 96. When EPA was directly questioned on
this policy at a 1982 hearing, an agency official acknowledged that this was agency policy and that
"for a large part of the hazardous waste spectrum, yes, landfilling is an appropriate alternative." Id.
at 163.
54. A 1982 case study by Peter Montague of four state-of-the-art land disposal facilities found
that each leaked toxic chemicals, even though each of the facilities used double liners and a leachate
collection system. 1982 House RCRA Hearings, supra note 6, at 67 (statement of Peter Montague).
Similarly, a 1983 study by the Office of Technology Assessment concluded that "land disposal, which
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Administrator Lee Thomas argued that land disposal was effectively regu-
lated by EPA and should be the primary option for disposal.5" Thus the
agency neglected the effective and available alternatives to land disposal.56
EPA also failed to choose the most protective regulatory option in
establishing land disposal design standards. The regulations that were
finally promulgated contained a series of technical requirements for the
design of land disposal facilities, such as the requirement that waste piles
and landfills have a single liner and leachate collection system.5" These
design requirements again ignored the availability of more technologically
advanced systems. The Office of Technology Assessment criticized the reg-
ulations: "[t]he reliability of this design is inferior to a double-liner with a
leak detection system.' 8 EPA was aware that surface impoundments
could be designed with two liners and a leak detection system between the
is used for as much as 80 percent of hazardous wastes, cannot even under the new [19821 EPA land
disposal regulations assure adequate protection of public health and environment, either in the
near-term or decades from now." 1983 House RCRA Hearings, supra note 47, at 119 (statement of
Joel S. Hirschhorn, quoting OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 174-86 (1983)). The State of
California's Office of Appropriate Technology presented a 1981 report which found that 70 percent of
that state's hazardous waste surface impoundments had been determined to have a "high potential for
groundwater contamination." Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1983: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate RCRA Hearings] (statement of S.
Kent Stoddard, referring to OFFICE OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ALTER-
NATIVES TO THE LAND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTES: AN ASSESSMENT FOR CALIFORNIA
(1981) [hereinafter cited as STATE OF CALIFORNIA REPORT]).
Even EPA's own reports indicated that of the 30,000 surface impoundments used for industrial
wastes, 70% were operating without any liner system and 39% were said to have a high potential to
contaminate groundwater. OFFICE OF DRINKING WATER, U.S. EPA, SURFACE IMPOUNDMENT AS-
SESSMENT NATIONAL REPORT 114-16 (1983).
55. "I would say as far as a last resort is concerned, at the current time it is a primary option for
our disposal, one that we feel we are regulating and will continue to regulate ... At some point in
time in the future, it may be a last resort. I don't know." 1983 House RCRA Hearings, supra note
47, at 378 (statement of Acting Assistant Administrator Lee Thomas).
56. Treatment methods and capacity other than land disposal are available, but sorely underuti-
lized. A study by the National Academy of Sciences found that there are technologies capable of
dealing with almost all hazardous wastes. COMMITTEE ON DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIAL
WASTES, NATIONAL MATERIALS ADVISORY BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGE-
MENT OF HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIAL WASTES iii (1983), reprinted in part in 1983 Senate RCRA
Hearings, supra note 54, at 178.
The OTA REPORT concluded that "there are technologically feasible alternatives that could be used
to reduce the volume of wastes generated or to treat wastes so as to permanently remove hazards."
1983 RCRA House Hearings, supra note 47, at 119-20. Similar conclusions were reached in the
STATE OF CALIFORNIA REPORT, which concluded that "it is technologically feasible to recycle, treat,
or destroy at least 75% of all the hazardous wastes which were disposed of in our Class I landfills,"
1983 RCRA Senate Hearings, supra note 54, at 135, citing STATE OF CALIFORNIA REPORT supra
note 54; and from testimony presented by firms using treatment technologies. See, e.g., 1983 RCRA
House Hearings, supra note 47, at 247 (statement of the Chemical Manufacturers Association).
57. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.251, 264.301 (1985). In addition, the regulations provided that any land
disposal facility, including surface impoundments, waste piles, and landfills, which installed two liners
and a leak detection system could be exempted from the extensive groundwater monitoring require-
ments. Id. at § 264.222 (1985).
58. OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at 186.
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liners,59 but obviously discounted this fact when promulgating the
regulations.
B. Inaction on Superfund
A similar pattern of delay and conscious misinterpretation of the law
occurred in the implementation of the Superfund program. Superfund was
designed for quick, effective action against sites that threatened communi-
ties.6" Congress provided EPA with enormous authority, discretion, and
funding to achieve massive cleanups promptly."1 In contrast, EPA's
emphasis was not on aggressively using these tools to clean up sites, but
on making sure that its actions caused minimal disruption and minimal
expenditure of federal funds.
EPA's implementation of CERCLA was guided in part by the desire to
discourage extension of the tax supporting Superfund after the five-year
tax mechanism expired in 1985.2 The tax could only continue if affirma-
tively extended by Congress. According to the sworn Congressional testi-
mony of William N. Hedeman, then Director of EPA's Office of Emer-
gency and Remedial Response and in charge of the day-to-day operation
of the Superfund program, the primary motivation behind the "go slow"
approach was to avoid reauthorization of the program: "[T]here was a
hidden agenda . . . not to set into motion events that would lead to what
59. EPA's groundwater monitoring exemption was also criticized. A House report called the
exemption entirely inappropriate. "EPA should not have to award bonuses to operators for merely
designing their facilities in an appropriate manner. Groundwater monitoring is a relatively inexpen-
sive, yet crucial, alert system for ascertaining facility integrity." The report determined that EPA had
"failed to require universally the application of available technology to minimize hazardous waste
releases into the environment." H. R. REP. No. 198, Part 1, 98th Cong. Ist Sess. 62, 63 (1983).
60. A part of CERCLA called for the development of criteria to be used in determining which
sites required immediate remedial action. Based on these criteria, a national priorities list of hazard-
ous waste cites was to be developed. The fund itself was to be used for the cleanup. 42 U.S.C. § 9605
(1982).
61. Superfund contained several provisions designed to create a list of the most dangerous sites,
which the federal government would quickly address. The liability provisions enacted by Congress
gave EPA enormous latitude to force cleanup. EPA could order parties to clean up and sue them for
treble damages if they failed to do so, or EPA could use the fund to clean up and then recover from
responsible parties. One important provision giving EPA authority to conduct cleanups provided:
The President shall select appropriate remedial actions determined to be necessary to carry
out this section which are to the extent practicable in accordance with the national contingency
plan and which provide for that cost-effective response which provides a balance between the
need for protection of public health and welfare and the environment at the facility under
consideration, and the availability of amounts from the Fund established under subchapter II
of this Chapter to respond to other sites which present or may present a threat to public health
or welfare or the environment, taking into consideration the need for immediate action.
Id. § 9604(c)(4).
62. OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 123-26. The
report describes the so-called "hidden agenda" of Administrator Anne Gorsuch and Assistant Admin-
istrator Rita Lavelle. They restricted cleanup activity under Superfund in order to diminish federal
involvement and foster increased reliance on state funds.
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is referred to as 'Son of Superfund' or the extension of the tax or reenact-
ment of the law beyond the 1985 cutoff.""3 Indeed, Administrator
Gorsuch wrote in a memorandum to the President's Cabinet Council on
Natural Resources and Environment: "[W]e are trying to avoid 'son of
superfund'."1
4
One example of EPA's efforts to avoid son of Superfund was the
agency's delay in developing and taking remedial action on the "National
Priorities List." EPA was required by CERCLA to publish a nationwide
priority list (NPL) of abandoned hazardous waste sites for Superfund
cleanup. 6 The first version of the final NPL,6" published in September
1983, included 406 facilities;6" with proposed additions it has now grown
to 850.68 Yet, although EPA had performed several studies and had begun
63. Id. at 124 (quoting EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses-Part 2: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1983)).
64. OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMIrEE REPORT, supra note 7 (quoting EPA:
Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses-Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 382,
389 (1983)).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(b). The NPL was compiled by EPA as follows: The states submitted to
EPA their priorities for action and EPA established criteria for ranking the states' submissions. The
law stipulated that, to the extent practicable, the list must include at least 400 of the highest priority
facilities, and must be updated on an annual basis. To facilitate EPA's compilation of the NPL,
CERCLA required owners of potential Superfund sites to notify the government of the type and
amount of hazardous waste on their property. Within 180 days after the law was enacted, any person
who owned or operated a disposal facility at the time that hazardous substances were "stored, treated
or disposed of" at such facility was required to notify EPA of the facilty's existence with information
about the amount and type of any hazardous substance to be found there. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c) (1982).
Only facilities accorded interim status under Subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act were ex-
empted from this requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1982). This inventory ultimately included
roughly 20,000 separate locations. HousE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUPERFUND
AMENDMENTS OF 1985, H. R. REP. No. 253, Part 1, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF 1985: PART 1].
66. In October 1981, EPA issued the first version of the Superfund priority list containing 114
sites, calling it the "Interim Priority List." U.S. EPA Release, EPA Announces First 114 Top-
Priority Superfund Sites (Oct. 23, 1981) (unpublished; copy on file with the Yale Journal on
Regulation).
67. Amendment to National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan; National Priorities
List, 48 Fed. Reg. 40670 (1983) amended by 49 Fed. Reg. 19,482 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. App.
B (1984)).
68. Amendment to National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan; The National Pri-
orities List, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,950, 37,951 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. App. B). The sites
ultimately selected were the most dangerous based on such criteria as the amount of hazardous wastes
they contained, the toxicity of the waste, the degree to which the wastes had already seeped into
groundwater, and the proximity and size of potentially exposed populations. EPA used a scoring
system known as the "Mitre Model" to rank sites. The model assigned numerical points to the crite-
ria considered, from which an aggregate score for the site was developed. The relatively arbitrary cut-
off score of 28.5 points was established for inclusion on the NPL. This cut-off score was based on the
lowest number of points assigned to the first 400 sites that the law required to be listed. For a
description of the methodology used to develop the Mitre Model, see OTA REPORT, supra note 18, at
383-84, 386-87.
Sites for the National Priorities List are chosen from a nationwide inventory, called the Emergency
Remedial Response Information System, kept by EPA. In 1985 there were at least 19,500 hazardous
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numerous negotiations with responsible parties, by January 1986 EPA
had completed remedial action at only eight sites on the NPL.6 ' This was
consistent with the Administration's ideology of minimizing federal inter-
vention in environmental matters and avoiding disruption of industry, but
was not consistent with Congress' expressed goal of cleaning up the envi-
ronment as quickly as possible.
EPA's decision to base cleanup standards on an ad hoc analysis of site-
specific factors also reflected the agency's disregard for the goals of the
Superfund program. This approach allowed EPA to ignore the environ-
mental safety standards carefully developed under other federal environ-
mental statutes to protect human health. Under the EPA regulations, for
example, maximum contamination levels for drinking water established
under the Safe Drinking Water Act"0 would not necessarily be attained by
a Superfund cleanup.7 1 Thus residents near "cleaned up" Superfund sites
might be exposed to concentrations of chemicals found dangerous under
the drinking water law. EPA justified its ad hoc policy by arguing that
each site was unique and that the Agency needed flexibility to respond to
each individual site differently.72 While the promulgation of standards for
Superfund cleanups requires difficult technical judgments about accept-
able risks, there should be no question that at least those standards devel-
oped under other laws to protect the public's health should apply to
Superfund remedies. Site-by-site standard setting allowed EPA to consider
factors which were not intended by Congress. The scandal-ridden history
of the first years of the program shows that factors such as the identity of
wastes sites in the inventory, and possibly as many as 130,000 to 378,000 additional eligible sites not
yet included. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, EPA's INVENTORY OF POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES IS INCOMPLETE 3, 6, 18-25
(1985).
69. 50 Fed. Reg. 53,448 (1985). EPA added that it has used Superfund money to take hundreds
of more limited, short-term actions, which were designed to stabilize the site while awaiting a more
permanent remedy and that it was making progress on final clean-ups at sites. Reauthorization of
Superfund, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1985) (testimony of Lee M. Thomas).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-(j) (1982).
71. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1985).
72. The introduction to EPA's cleanup standard regulations states:
EPA developed the methodology for determining the appropriate extent of remedy based on
the recognition that experience in developing remedies for hazardous waste sites is limited.
Moreover, each hazardous waste site has unique characteristics which merit individual atten-
tion. Often the unique characteristics of sites will represent factors that have never been dealt
with before. These considerations led EPA to develop a methodology which would provide
structured and reasoned decision-making while still allowing the flexibility to deal with unique
and unforeseen characteristics .... The system does not explicitly require that environmental
standards be used in determining the appropriate extent of remedy.
Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180, 31,184-85 (1982).
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the private parties responsible and the political affiliation of local officials
were allowed to influence the cleanup requirements significantly."'
Site-by-site standard setting also gave EPA discretion in weighing factors.
The choice of which standard to apply to site cleanups directly affected
the cost to the federal fund and the responsible parties. It also, however,
affected the level of risk faced by those whose land and water were
threatened by the site. Unfortunately, according to representatives of com-
munities around sites, EPA approached cleanup on an ad hoc site-by-site
basis and health standards were not uniformly applied.
As a result of a lawsuit,7 ' in November 1985 EPA issued new uniform
national standards for Superfund cleanups which incorporated many of
the health standards developed under other major federal environmental
laws. 75 The Agency stated, however, that it was adopting the standards as
a matter of policy, and not because it was legally obligated to do so. 7 6
EPA maintains that it may drop some or all of the borrowed standards as
a matter of administrative discretion.77
Despite the delegation of enormous authority, discretion, and funding to
EPA, the massive cleanup effort envisioned and directed by Congress did
not occur. EPA's reluctance to commit trust funds and its continued resist-
ance to the imposition of any burden on industry resulted in a cleanup
73. See OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS REPORT, supra note 7, at 158-243.
74. In 1982, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sued EPA to compel the agency to develop
uniform national standards for the cleanup of Superfund sites. Environmental Defense Fund v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. 82-2234 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The legal theory of
the case was two-fold. First, EDF argued that the Superfund program was legally required to comply
with the specific standards contained in other major environmental laws because CERCLA did not
contain either an express or implied repeal of such provisions. Thus, if regulations promulgated under
the Safe Drinking Water Act contained a binding maximum contamination level for a certain chemi-
cal, a Superfund cleanup should ensure that the level of the chemical in the drinking water affected by
the waste dump was brought down at least to the required maximum standard. Second, EDF con-
tended that EPA's failure to issue uniform cleanup regulations incorporating the standards contained
in other environmental laws basically amounted to a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act's
prohibition of arbitrary and capricious administrative action. The central relief sought by the lawsuit
was the promulgation of such uniform regulations.
75. In January 1984, EDF settled its lawsuit with EPA. The settlement agreement stipulated
that the agency would promulgate regulations that applied "relevant quantitative health and environ-
mental standards and criteria" developed by EPA under other programs to the selection of a
Superfund remedy. A little over a year later, the agency did in fact propose a series of detailed
amendments to the National Contingency Plan in response to the settlement agreement. National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 50 Fed. Reg. 5862 (1985) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 300). In November 1985, these revisions were promulgated in final form. National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pullution Contingency Plan; Final Rule, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,912 (1985) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300).
76. In adopting the regulations, EPA stated that "the requirements of other Federal environmen-
tal and public health laws, while not legally applicable to CERCLA response actors, will generally
guide EPA in determining the appropriate extent of cleanup..." 50 Fed. Reg. at 47,912, 47,917
(1985).
77. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1985).
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program that virtually everyone has described as inadequate."8 Thus, in
its implementation of Superfund, as in its implementation of RCRA, EPA
subordinated the goals of the statutes to those of the Administration.
EPA's efforts under both statutes were hopelessly behind schedule, techni-
cally misguided, and substantively ineffective. The result in both cases was
that hazardous waste disposal practices and cleanup activities advanced
little from the time the legislation was enacted.
III. Congress Narrows Agency Discretion
In the early 1980's, evidence of the seriousness and scope of the hazard-
ous waste problem mounted while EPA stalled. Congress grew increas-
ingly frustrated with the obvious manipulation practiced by the political
appointees at the Agency, as well as with the substantive environmental
policy the Agency pursued.
In 1983, five and one-half years after the mandatory deadline for pro-
mulgation of RCRA standards and permits, the 98th Congress began a
reauthorization process for RCRA. There was still no enforceable system
for regulating the disposal of hazardous waste and little prospect for one
soon. The problems recognized in 1976 had become common knowledge
and, by 1983, evidence of the dangers was even more compelling. Not
surprisingly, Congress made clear that it would not allow the delays to
continue. Any confidence that EPA could be trusted to act expeditiously
had long since evaporated. Witnesses at Congressional hearings urged a
legislative solution requiring that disposal firms obtain a permit and meet
the federal operating standards.7 9
Congress responded by reauthorizing RCRA with a maze of new dead-
lines and statutory requirements.8" For instance, all land disposal facilities
operating under an "interim status" permit were required to submit
applications for final permits by November 8, 1985, one year after the
date of enactment."' This provision removed EPA's discretion to allow
facilities to delay the submission of applications.82 In response to these
new statutory directives, the final permit applications now included a va-
78. See, e.g., SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF 1985, PART 1, supra note 65, at 55.
79. In testimony before Congress, witnesses made it clear that "the permitting process for hazard-
ous waste facilities [must) be completed as quickly as possible so that the necessary upgrading of
existing [interim status] facilities to meet RCRA standards can be accomplished." 1983 House RCRA
Hearings, supra note 47, at 455.
80. For a partial list of RCRA deadlines which EPA has identified, see ENVTL. F., Nov. 1985,
at 4-5.
81. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
82. The amendments also placed a deadline on EPA's issuance of final permits. Final permits for
all land disposal facilities had to be issued no later than Nov. 8, 1988, and by Nov. 8, 1989 for all
incinerators. Id. at § 6925(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
Yale Journal on Regulation
riety of demanding requirements, such as a summary of groundwater
monitoring data for the facility and a description of any groundwater con-
tamination by the facility. 8 If the contamination exceeded certain levels,
the applicant had to establish a corrective action program to mitigate the
contamination."' These requirements meant that a permit applicant had
to collect a variety of detailed information and'establish plans to clean
up groundwater contamination before a permit application could be
submitted. Any interim status facility that failed to submit its final permit
application by the statutory deadline automatically lost its interim permit.
Without interim status, such a facility would be required to cease operat-
ing, with criminal penalties for operating a facility without a permit.88
Over two-thirds of all operating, interim-status land disposal facilities
chose not to submit final permit applications. Their failure to meet the
statutory deadline effectively removed over 1000 land disposal facilities
which were reluctant to comply with federal standards from the permit
process, and thereby from the business of handling hazardous waste.
Thus, the November 1985 permit application deadline accomplished more
to insure the safe disposal of hazardous waste than nine years of agency
inaction had done.8"
The 1984 RCRA reauthorization also altered the design standards for
waste facilities. The law defined the minimum technological standards
required of landfills and surface impoundments.87 For example, EPA's
design regulations were required to provide that, at a minimum, each new
landfill or surface impoundment install "two or more liners and a leachate
collection system above (in the case of a landfill) and between such liners;
and groundwater monitoring." 88 Until EPA could promulgate such rules,
Congress established a precise description of the liners requirement:
83. Id. at § 6925(e)(2)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 270.14(c)(l)-(6) (1985).
84. Id. at § 270.14(c)(7)-(8).
85. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
86. According to an agency release "492 hazardous waste land disposal facilities operating under
interim status have . . . applied for a final operating permit . . [out of] approximately 1600 land
disposal facilities . . . authorized to operate under interim status prior to November 8." U.S. EPA
Release, 492 Hazardous Waste Facilities Certify Compliance (Dec. 6, 1985) (unpublished; on file
with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
The so-called Loss of Interim Status provision also required interim status land disposal facilities to
certify that they were in compliance with applicable groundwater monitoring and financial responsi-
bility requirements for such facilities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6925(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1985). Surveys by
Congress and the General Accounting Office revealed widespread noncompliance with these require-
ments. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 1ST SEss., GROUNDWATER MONITORING SURVEY
(Comm. Print 1985); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INSPECTION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PER-
MITTING ACTIVITIES AT NEW JERSEY AND TENNESSEE HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES (1984).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6924(o) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6924(o)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
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[Tihe requirement for the installation of two or more liners may be
satisfied by the installation of a top liner . . . and a lower liner
designed, operated and constructed to prevent the migration of any
constituent through such liner .... For the purpose of the preceding
sentence, a lower liner shall be deemed to satisfy such requirement if
it is constructed of at least a 3-foot thick layer of recompacted clay or
other natural material with a permeability of no more than 1 x 10- 7
centimeters per second."
This detailed specification of design criteria stands in stark contrast to the
original language in the 1976 Act which stated only that EPA was to
promulgate regulations governing the "location, design, and construction"
of disposal facilities. 90
Congressional reluctance to rely on EPA judgments was not limited to
technological standards, but extended into all areas of the RCRA pro-
gram. For example, the reauthorization calls upon EPA to develop per-
formance standards for new storage tanks. The 1984 law, using broad
language similar to the 1976 Congressional mandate, directed the Agency
to develop storage tank standards which "shall include, but need not be
limited to, design, construction, installation, release detection, and compat-
ibility standards."91 The new underground tank provisions, however, go
further."' They provide that, until the effective date of EPA's new stand-
ards, tanks lacking corrosive protection may be installed only "if soil tests
conducted in accordance with ASTM Standard G57-78, or another
standard approved by the Administrator, show that soil resistivity in an
installation location is 12,000 ohm/cm or more (unless a more stringent
standard is prescribed by the Administration by rule).""
Another example of Congressional dissatisfaction with EPA is the artic-
ulation in the RCRA reauthorization of a new national policy to discour-
age land disposal of hazardous waste. 4 As well as coming together on a
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6924(o)(5)(B) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 6907(a) (1982).
91. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6691b(e) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
92. They state that until EPA's regulations are promulgated, no person may install an under-
ground storage tank unless the tank will prevent releases due to corrosion for the life of the tank.
Tanks must be "cathodically protected against corrosion, constructed of noncorrosive material, steel
clad with a noncorrosive material, or designed in a manner" to prevent possible leaks. Finally, the
material used in the construction or lining of the tank must be compatible with the substance to be
stored. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6991b(g)(l) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6991b(g)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(b)(8) (West Supp. 1984-1985). The House version found that "land
disposal facilities are not capable of ensuring perpetual containment of certain hazardous waste, there-
fore, reliance on land disposal should be eliminated for those wastes." H.R. 2867, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 12(a), 130 CONG. REC. H9154 (1983). The House bill also added a new goal to the Solid
Waste Disposal Act of 1983: "minimizing the generation of hazardous waste and the land disposal of
hazardous waste by encouraging process substitution, materials recovery, properly conducted recycling
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broad statement of policy, the House and Senate also agreed to detailed
provisions designed eventually to prohibit the land disposal of particular
toxic wastes.95 These provisions set out in detail the wastes which must be
prohibited, along with the limited conditions under which EPA may side-
step the prohibitions. This statute lists, with an extraordinary degree of
detail for a federal regulatory law, the kinds and concentrations of specific
wastes which are banned from land disposal."
and reuse, and treatment." Id. at § 12(b). The accompanying House Report made it clear that the
House Committee "intends to convey a clear and unambiguous message to the regulated community
and the Environmental Protection Agency: reliance on land disposal of hazardous waste has resulted
in an unacceptable risk to human health and the environment." H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 56 (1983). Similarly, the Senate bill, S. 757, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 26(b), 130 CONG. REC.
S9138 (1984), amended RCRA to include a national policy statement which read: "The Congress
hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that, whenever feasible, the generation
of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible. Waste that is neverthe-
less generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat
to human health and the environment." Both the House and Senate provisions were eventually incor-
porated into the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 101, 98
Stat. 3224, 3224 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6902).
95. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, § 201, 98 Stat. 3224, 3226 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 6924).
96. For example, Congress described certain solvents and dioxins as "(A) dioxin-containing haz-
ardous wastes numbered F020, F021, F022, and F023 (as referred to in the proposed rule published
by the Administrator in the Federal Register for April 4, 1983), and (B) those hazardous wastes
numbered F001, F002, F003, F004, and F005 in regulations promulgated by the Administrator under
section 3001 (40 C.F.R. 261.31 (July 1, 1983)), as those regulations are in effect on July 1, 1983."
42 U.S.C.A. § 6924(e)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985). Also, using a list developed by the State of
California, the statutory ban applies to the following wastes:
(A) Liquid hazardous wastes, including free liquids associated with any solid or sludge,
containing free cyanides at concentrations greater than or equal to 1,000 mg/I.
(B) Liquid hazardous wastes, including free liquids associated with any solid or sludge,
containing the following metals (or elements) or compounds of these metals (or elements) at
concentrations greater than or equal to those specified below:
(i) arsenic and/or compounds (as As) 500 mg/I;
(ii) cadmium and/or compounds (as Cd) 100 mg/I;
(iii) chromium (VI and/or compounds (as Cr VI) 500 mg/I;
(iv) lead and/or compounds (as Ph) 500 mg/I;
(v) mercury and/or compounds (as Hg) 20 mg/I;
(vi) nickel and/or compounds (as Ni) 134 mg/l;
(vii) selenium and/or compounds (as Se) 100 mg/l; and
(viii) thallium and/or compounds (as Th [sic]) 130 mg/I.
(C) Liquid hazardous waste having a pH less than or equal to two (2.0).
(D) Liquid hazardous wastes containing polychlorinated biphenyls at concentrations greater
than or equal to 50 ppm.
(E) Hazardous wastes containing halogenated organic compounds in total concentration
greater than or equal to 1,000 mg/kg.
42 U.S.C.A. § 6924(d)(2) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
The statute also provides that for the specifically identified wastes, the land disposal ban will take
effect unless the waste has been treated in accordance with standards promulgated by EPA, 42
U.S.C.A. § 6924(m) (West Supp. 1984-1985), or unless EPA approves a site-specific petition from a
facility which establishes that continued acceptance of the waste will not endanger human health and
the environment. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6924(d), (e), (g) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
Regarding the specific lists of banned wastes, the minority view of the House report states that:
We in Congress do not have the technical expertise to declare such prohibitions ... How do
we know that the specific wastes listed ... should be prohibited from all forms of land dispo-
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The technical specificity pervasive throughout the reauthorization
prompted several lawmakers to comment that Congress was overstepping
its bounds.97 For example, Senator Symms remarked during consideration
of the Conference Report on the 1984 Amendments that:
The fundamental problem with this bill is that it attempts to write
detailed regulations into the law. Can any member of this body
explain ... why the lower liner of a hazardous waste disposal facil-
ity should have a permeability of lx10 "7 centimeter per second?...
I submit that making these kinds of technical judgments is the func-
tion of EPA, not Congress. These particular regulations may be
workable, even appropriate, but writing regulations is not our job."
While Senator Symms' comments about the technical expertise of Con-
gress are relevant, they fail to consider that without such specific action by
Congress, the Agency would have continued to obstruct Congressional
intent at every opportunity.
Although the reauthorization of Superfund awaits final agreement in a
House-Senate Conference Committee, the legislative history thus far
reveals that Congress is as dissatisfied with EPA's implementation of
Superfund as it was with EPA's efforts with regard to RCRA. Five years
after the enactment of Superfund, the Agency has made little progress in
cleaning up the nation's most dangerous hazardous waste disposal sites.
Testimony by New York Attorney General Robert Abrams was typical of
the criticisms:
sal? How do we know that the concentration levels specified are appropriate? These are
regulatory decisions which should not be made by Congress...
If this [RCRA Reauthorization] bill has a general weakness, it is that it is close to being a
regulatory rather than a legislative document. Nowhere is that exemplified better than in this
[land ban] section.
H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1983).
If EPA fails to promulgate treatment standards before the statutory deadline or to approve a peti-
tion, the waste is simply banned from land disposal until the Agency acts. As with the submission of
permits, and the minimum technological requirements, the ban on land disposal minimizes the need
for EPA action. The statute sets forth the specific rules from which EPA may carve out exceptions,
rather than requiring EPA to establish rules in the first instance.
97. In addition, some observers of Congress have seen problems of interpretation, implementation
and enforcement created in some areas as Congress attempted to close loopholes and wrap a tight rein
around hazardous waste disposal. Mugdan & Adler, The 1984 RCRA Amendments: Congress as a
Regulatory Agency, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L, 215 (1985). For example, enforcement problems might
be expected to result from a provision in the amendments (§ 3001(d)(6)) that allows small quantity
generators to accumulate waste for 180 days rather than the 90 days permitted other generators, with
an exemption for generators that must transport wastes more than 200 miles. Id. at 220. Another
example involves possible interpretations of the term "good faith compliance" as applied to interim
status facilities. Id. at 225, referring to Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 243(a), 98 Stat. 3224, 3260 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6936(b)(3)).
98. 130 CONG. REc. S13812 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984).
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Two shocking facts emerge. . . . First, only one-third of the money
obligated for cleanups has actually been spent. Second, 21/2 times as
much money has been spent on administrative costs as on actual
cleanups. Moreover, a close examination of the money supposedly
spent on cleanups shows that much of that is going for preliminary
studies and design work. In fiscal 1983, for example, actual perma-
nent cleanup work was done at only 17 sites; 124 sites were still in
the study stage. It is astonishing to me that at the end of the year,
with 60 percent of the Superfund time period elapsed, a mere $13.2
million-less than 1 percent of the $1.6 billion fund-had been
spent on permanent remedial cleanups at hazardous waste sites."
In at least two areas-the rates at which abandoned sites are being
cleaned up and the pollutant standards the remedial efforts must sat-
isfy-congressional dissatisfaction with EPA is again being expressed in
the form of highly specific statutory language. All of the major Superfund
reauthorization bills considered in the House during the 98th and 99th
Congresses contained provisions putting EPA's cleanup activities on a
non-discretionary schedule.1 00 The Administration objected, arguing that
deadlines for commencing remedial efforts would simply inhibit the
Agency's ability to complete the work properly. The Agency claimed it
would achieve more without such requirements. 1 Nevertheless, in the
various House Committees, the debate centered on how strict the sched-
ules should be, not whether or not to have schedules.1 02 The legislation
99. Implementation of the Superfund Program: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Transportation and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
464 (1984) (statement of Robert Abrams) (hereinafter cited as Reauthorization Hearings I]. Attorney
General Abrams continued:
And, despite the apparent flurry of activity at EPA, it is still true that for 400 of the 546
Superfund sites, the planning and design of a remedial program have not even begun. I believe
that EPA's poor implementation of Superfund to date points to the need for a much more
specific mandate to clean up hazardous waste sites. Superfund, as it is now written, gives EPA
far more discretion than any other major environmental statute. The Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts both impose many mandatory duties and timetables on EPA. These specific man-
dates have served to keep EPA's feet to the fire and to give the public the kind of implementa-
tion it expects.
Id. at 465.
100. See, e.g., H.R. 4813, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 101 (1984) (inserting § 9004A in the Solid
Waste Disposal Act); H.R. 5640, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 111 (1984), 130 CONG. REC. H8819-55
(daily ed. Aug. 9, 1984) and 130 CONG. REc. H8929-9027 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984); H.R. 2022,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1985); and H.R. 2817 and 2005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 104 (1985), 131
CONG. REC. H11,595-671 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985).
101. Reauthorization of and Possible Amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources
of the House Public Works and Transportation Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1984) (testimony of
Lee. M. Thomas).
102. SUPERFUNn AMENDMENTS OF 1985: PART 1, supra note 65, at 71, 261-62; HousE COMM.
ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF 1985, H.R. REP. No.
253, Part 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1985) (hereinafter cited as SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF
1985: PART 5).
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passed by the House in December 1985108 required the Agency to com-
mence "substantial and continuous physical on-site remedial action" at
specified numbers of National Priorities List sites during each year of the
five-year reauthorization period.'"
Despite the pleas for flexibility from both EPA and the industry, both
the House and Senate Superfund reauthorization bills also included provi-
sions requiring the application of uniform standards to all cleanup sites."',
The Senate bill mandated that all Superfund remedial actions attain max-
imum acceptable contamination levels which, at a minimum, assure pro-
tection of human health and the environment. This requirement corre-
sponds to the standard under RCRA, which is one of the most protective
103. H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(m) (1985).
104. Id. During each year of the five-year reauthorization period, the Agency must begin a speci-
fied number of remedial investigations and feasibility studies for NPL sites: 150 studies in the first
year, 175 in the second year and 200 in each of the last three years. The studies are the first critical
step in implementing long-term remedial action. By January 1, 1988, EPA must list 1600 facilities on
the Superfund NPL.
105. In fact, EPA's adverse reaction to uniform standards heightened the concern by some that
EPA would fail to require adequate cleanup. An EDF representative testified on the need for uniform
national standards in the reauthorization legislation:
EPA has developed a policy of setting "site-specific" cleanup goals rather than a standard
baseline to ensure that no less of a cleanup than that necessary to protect human health and
the environment is implemented.
EPA's desire for vagueness in determining an appropriate extent of remedy can only be
interpreted as a desire to fall short of the minimum protection of human health and the envi-
ronment in some situations. Further guidance from Congress is clearly needed to ensure ap-
propriate cleanup response by EPA. Without it, adequate protection of public health cannot be
assured, and political pressure will continue to be a large factor in determining the course of
remedial action.
Reauthorization Hearings I, supra note 99, at 106 (statement of Linda Greer).
Witnesses provided concrete examples of site cleanups where they contended that the absence of
standards had endangered public health. At the Chemical Metals Industries site in Baltimore,
Maryland, the clean-up was superficial and the off-site clean-up was totally inadequate. The contam-
inated soil was removed to a depth of one foot even though significant levels of contamination were
detected as deep as fifteen feet. Off-site residents may be at risk of exposure to toxic gases, including
hydrogen cyanide, by subsurface contamination. In the case of the Gratiot Golf Course site in St.
Louis, Michigan, the contaminated soil was merely shifted from one side of the Pine River to the
other. The state still warns against fish consumption as far as 60 miles downstream of the site.
Reauthorization of Superfund: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation and
Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 640-41 (1985) (state-
ment of Richard Hind).
All of the major versions of both the House and the Senate Superfund reauthorization bills con-
tained provisions establishing uniform national cleanup standards for remedial actions carried out
under the program. S. 2892, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 104 (1984); H.R. 5640, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., §
107, 130 CONG. REC. H8819-55 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1984) and 130 CONG. REC. H8929-9027 (daily
ed. Aug. 10, 1984); S. 51, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 111, 130 CONG. REc. S138 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
1985); H.R. 2022, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 111 (1985). The Senate took the approach of prescribing a
general standard and leaving it to the Agency to derive specific standards for individual hazardous
substances or cleanup technologies, while the House set forth specific standards in the legislation and
gave the Agency the opportunity to waive them if they turned out to be inappropriate in the context of
a particular site. See, e.g., S. 51, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 111, 130 CONG. REC. S138 (daily ed. Jan. 3,
1985); H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 121 (1985).
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in any of the major federal environmental laws. The bill allowed no
waivers.1 06
The House bill goes much further. It adopted the same general "protec-
tion of human health and the environment" standard, without any waiver
provision. It goes on, however, to list the specific standards, established
under other major federal environmental laws, that must be incorporated
into the cleanup standards for remedial actions under Superfund, 0 7
While House and Senate conferees are still meeting to reach a compro-
mise between the two versions of the bill, it is inevitable that the final
product will require cleanup standards which meet those standards set by
other environmental laws, since both bills already specify such a require-
ment. While only the House version has outlined a mandatory cleanup
schedule, Congress' overwhelming concern over EPA's past inaction dem-
onstrates a willingness by Congress to force EPA to act under very spe-
cific guidelines. Despite differences in the degree to which EPA's discre-
tion was limited, the intent of both the Senate and House bills was to
ensure that any cleanup met uniform standards which were consistent
with other environmental laws. 08
As with the 1984 RCRA amendments, 09 Congress' reaction to EPA's
failure to implement the Superfund program satisfactorily appears, to
date, to be to act as regulator and sharply limit EPA's discretion. The
House bill requires EPA to begin cleanup activities at a specified rate and
both bills direct EPA to meet specific maximum contamination standards
for cleanup.1 Since effective Superfund implementation requires affirma-
tive action by the Agency, Congress cannot achieve its environmental goals
106. S. 51, supra note 105. The Senate bill also provided that remedial actions leading to "per-
manent solutions" are "to be preferred" over temporary containment remedies. While giving EPA
useful guidance on this often controversial issue, the Senate language leaves the Agency with substan-
tial discretion over the choice of technologies at a site. Id. § 111.
107. H.R. 2817 (H.R. 2005), § 121. The House legislation also states "permanent solutions" are
the preferred technology for Superfund clean-ups. The legislation requires EPA, to the maximum
extent practicable, to select permanent solutions when such solutions are feasible and achievable. It
goes on to describe the factors EPA shall consider in making such determinations, and requires EPA
to establish an "Interim Category," composed of all sites on the NPL where a permanent solution has
not been implemented.
108. See SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF 1985: PART 1, supra note 65, at 95-100, 272-82;
SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF 1985, PART 5, supra note 102, at 50-58; and SENATE COMM. ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, SUPERFUND IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1985, S. REP. No. 11,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1985).
109. Others have recognized EPA's failure to heed RCRA's mandates as the spur to the ex-
traordinary regulatory detail Congress included in the 1984 RCRA Amendments: ". . . between 1980
and 1983, Congress came to perceive EPA as an agency unwilling or unable to fulfill its mandate of
environmental protection. Almost every section of the RCRA Amendments might be read as expres-
sing a sense of frustration over the pace and scope of EPA action. For these reasons Congress elected
to act, in effect, as its own regulatory agency." Mugdan & Adler, supra note 97, at 217.
110. H.R. 2005, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 104, 121, 131 CONG. REc. H11595-671 (daily ed. Dec.
10, 1985).
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by simply prohibiting certain activities as it did in the RCRA amend-
ments. Instead, the proposed amendments use administrative constraints,
namely deadlines and mandatory uniform standards, to force EPA to
make progress toward safe cleanups."'
IV. Implications of the RCRA and CERCLA Reauthorizations
Between 1887, when the Interstate Commerce Commission was estab-
lished, and 1980, the congressional paradigm for coping with regulatory
problems remained largely unchanged1 ' Congress established regulatory
agencies, issued rather general guidelines for agency decisionmaking, and
delegated to the agencies discretion over the details of rules and imple-
mentation tactics. Congress has occasionally altered the scope and content
of specific regulatory goals in response to new economic theories, changed
conditions, and public opinion, but generally, it has maintained a stable
relationship with the administrative agencies: the legislature has formu-
lated broad policy objectives and the agencies have devised the means to
achieve them. 1
In the area of hazardous waste regulation during the 1980's, however,
the traditional reliance on delegated responsibility has collapsed, with
111. Id. Mugdan & Adler, supra note 97, at 217, have suggested that the 1984 RCRA Amend-
ments are a vindication of Justice Rehnquist's view that Congress has on occasion improperly dele-
gated to the executive branch its own constitutional responsibility to make legislative decisions. See
Rehnquist's discussion of the "nondelegation doctrine"-that Congress, as the branch of our govern-
ment most responsive to popular will, is best suited and most obligated to make important choices of
social policy-in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672,
685 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (obligations imposed by Congress upon the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration).
112. For example, the relatively broad mandates in the 1976 RCRA Act are similar to those
established as far back as 1887 in the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1(7)-(15) (1959):
The Commission may, after hearing, on a complaint or upon its own inititative without
complaint, establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service by
common carriers by railroad subject to this chapter ...
Whenever the Commission is of opinion that shortage of equipment, congestion of traffic, or
other emergency requiring immediate action exists in any section of the country, the
Commission shall have, and it is given, authority . . . to suspend the operation of any and all
rules, regulations, or practices then established with respect to car service for such time as may
be determined by the Commission . . . to give directions for preference or priority in transpor-
tation, embargoes, or movement of traffic under permits, at such time and for such periods as it
may determine, and to modify, change, suspend, or annul them.
49 U.S.C.A. § 1(14)(a)-(15).
Indeed, it was Congress' self-professed inability to make finely-tuned regulatory determinations that
led to the development of regulatory institutions in the first place, such as rate-setting under the
Interstate Commerce Act as established in the 1906 Hepburn Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1, 6, 11, 14-16, 18,
.20, 41 (1982). D. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 229-31 (1972).
For a general discussion of the broad delegation of authority to administrative agencies by Con-
gress, see Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1982).
113. For a description of the general reluctance of Congress to delve into regulatory micro-
management, see A. STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 184-86 (1982).
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profound implications for the overall regulatory structure. The wide dis-
crepancy between the public's desire for vigorous environmental protection
and the Reagan Administration's ideological preference for regulatory
relief has forced Congress to produce a new regulatory system that signifi-
cantly reduces agency discretion. Unfortunately, the inherent institutional
limitations of Congress guarantee that this new order will have drawbacks
not present in the traditional relationship between Congress and regula-
tory agencies. Nevertheless, where agencies have flagrantly and consis-
tently refused to carry out legislative mandates, such drastic action by
Congress is warranted.
A. The Threshold for Congressional Action
The RCRA and CERCLA cases suggest that Congress is ready and
willing to make specific policy and implementation decisions, but only if
the less drastic methods for disciplining agencies are ineffective. First,
Congress will always use the more informal oversight mechanisms,
including investigations and appropriations review, before resorting to
statutory cures. Second, Congress will not intervene if other forces, such as
direct political pressure on the Executive or lawsuits by advocates of the
congressional position, create the requisite incentives to induce agency
compromise. Even if neither of these methods is successful, Congress will
often not intervene unless some event, such as an environmental disaster,
an upsurge in public concern, or the approaching expiration of the pro-
gram, moves the issue to the top of the legislative agenda.
As a general matter, Congress acts only when it is driven by exogenous
political forces to act. In the regulatory area, for example, the original
statutory creation of a remedial program is usually a response to extreme
public pressure, often fueled by crises. Systematic reconsideration of the
program design often occurs only when the existing authorization period
has run out. Absent public crisis or impending lapse of an existing statute,
regulatory issues will not reach the top of the congressional agenda. 14
The history of RCRA demonstrates typical congressional reluctance to
use the powerful tool of legislation to correct administrative problems.
Despite the delays and obstructionist tactics of EPA, Congress began to
address the problem with legislative direction only when the time ap-
pointed for reauthorization approached. Congress did not take legislative
action until more than five years after EPA missed its deadlines for
promulgating RCRA regulations on permit standards. When the need to
114. This approach by Congress has been labelled "crisis regulation." A. STONE, supra note 113,
at 179-80.
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reauthorize triggered congressional evaluation, however, the nearly uni-
versal frustrations with the experience of the previous five years produced
a majority in favor of drastic action.
In both the RCRA and CERCLA programs, Congress did attempt to
use the other tools at its disposal to direct the EPA implementation effort.
Under most administrations, the appropriations process provides the
greatest opportunity for congressional influence over agencies. During the
Reagan era, however, when agency heads have often sought to contract or
even abolish their own agencies, the congressional influence derived from
the power of the purse has been greatly diminished.'15 Congress also used
oversight hearings to investigate alleged wrongdoing at EPA."' These
hearings highlighted grossly improper behavior by agency officials and
clear failure to implement the laws. The hearings were successful in that
Reagan was forced to replace Burford and to clean house among the top
EPA officials. These personnel changes muted the confrontational tone of
EPA, but did little to change the basic attitudes of the Administration
toward environmental regulation or to speed the implementation of the
laws. The traditional means of congressional oversight failed to produce
the desired results.
The efforts of parties outside Congress to force implementation of the
laws also failed in large part. Legal actions against an offending agency
can be used to ensure that the letter of the law is followed. In the environ-
mental area particularly and the regulatory field generally, lawsuits and
threatened lawsuits by interest groups representing the regulated parties
and the beneficiaries have given both the public and the judiciary impor-
tant roles in ensuring that the agencies implement the statutes as
written.'1  Lawsuits, however, are expensive, time-consuming, and resolve
115. On several occasions, Congress actually approved regulatory agency budgets larger than
requested by the Administration. For example, EPA's final fiscal year 1983 appropriation exceeded
the Administration's request by $84 million. President Signs Bill Worth $3.7 Billion for EPA, $84
Million More Than Requested, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 779 (Oct. 8, 1982).
The EPA budget, which was well over $5.4 billion in the last two years of the Carter Administra-
tion, dropped to only $3.0 billion in 1981. In spite of subsequent budget increase requests the current
budget request for fiscal year 1987 is still only $4.1 billion. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
FY 1987 HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, table 5.2(1)
(1986).
116. See Gorsuch, 36 Other EPA Employees, Lavelle Subpoenaed by Dingell's Energy Subcom-
mittee, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1827-28 (Feb. 18, 1983).
117. In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F. 2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied 403 U.S. 923 (1971), Judge Leventhal remarked that judicial review:
combines judicial supervision with a salutory principle of judicial restraint, an awareness that
agencies and courts together constitute a "partnership" in the furtherance of the public interest
and are "collaborative instrumentalities of justice". The court is in a real sense part of the total
administrative process, and not a hostile stranger to the office of first instance.
See also National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (challenging
NLRB adjudication); American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Veneman, 349 F. Supp. 1311 (D.D.C. 1972)
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only a relatively narrow legal question. In the case of hazardous waste,
despite outside party suits such as by the Environmental Defense Fund,'
judicial and public oversight also fell short.
The failure of congressional and outside efforts to push EPA into com-
pliance with the letter and spirit of the hazardous waste laws can be
explained by looking at the forces driving each side. The Administration
interpreted President Reagan's overwhelming reelection victory as a man-
date to continue his regulatory philosophy, which includes contracting the
role of the federal government." 9 At the same time, every poll showed
that Americans cared deeply about protecting the environment and felt
that government should do more, not less, to protect it."' Congress' politi-
cal sensitivity to the need to move forward with efforts to protect the envi-
ronment further demonstrated that the Administration's philosophy of
environmental regulation was not shared by most Americans.
Many years of frustration with EPA left lawmakers with no choice but
to assume the role of regulator, however reluctantly. 12 1 In the reauthoriza-
tions of the hazardous waste laws the frustrations produced technically
detailed design specifications and strict schedules and procedures for the
administration of federal remedial activities, in stark contrast to the broad
delegations of power to the Agency's technical and administrative experts
in the original legislation. The RCRA reauthorization, for example, called
for the submission of permits that met required conditions and banned the
land disposal of specified wastes by statutorily-set dates. The same pattern
(challenging FDA's delay in implementation of efficacy requirement for new drugs). See generally S.
MENICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS 351-52 (1983).
118. For a discussion of EDF's suit against EPA for uniform national standards for Superfund
site cleanups, see supra notes 74 and 75. When an agency is resisting Congress on every front, how-
ever, lawsuits are relatively ineffective as disciplinary devices. The suits focus only on the relatively
narrow issues of a particular agency decision or rulemaking. Courts are unable to give effective warn-
ings to agencies that have a broad "attitude problem."
In addition, lawsuits have become so commonplace as agency-forcing devices that certain adminis-
trative agencies, such as the EPA, are examining alternate methods of rulemaking which incorporate
the concerns of interested parties at less cost in time and resources. See Susskind & McMahon, The
Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985) (documenting suc-
cessful negotiated rulemaking demonstrations carried out by EPA).
119. For poll data showing discrepancies between support for the President and support for poli-
cies associated with him, see Ferguson & Rogers, The Myth of America's Turn to the Right, ATLAN-
TIC, May 1986, at 43.
120. See id. and supra note 5.
121. Senator Lloyd Bentsen accurately described Congress' reluctant role as regulator during the
Senate's consideration of its version of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984:
It is a troubling dilemma when Congress must address detailed technical problems as a
matter of public policy. Unfortunately, we do not have the expertise to acquire and assess the
information on these problems in the same fashion as a regulatory agency. Generally, we are
not scientists, we are not engineers, we do not have the detailed experience in the design,
construction and operation of various technical alternatives. Nevertheless, when public policy
demands it, Congress must be prepared to squarely confront these difficult decisions.
130 CONG. REC. S9153 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).
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of statutory specificity is reflected in the pending Superfund bills. The
House has made it clear, for instance, that actual on-site cleanup work
must begin according to a prescribed schedule. For Congress to fail to
respond with these kinds of specific requirements is to abandon hope of
cleaning up the environment in the face of the Administration's noninter-
ventionist philosophy.
B. Institutional Disadvantages of Congress as Regulator and
Administrator
As a matter of institutional capabilities, administrative agencies are bet-
ter suited than Congress, both substantively and procedurally, for the im-
plementation of complex statutes. In theory, an administrative agency acts
with the expertise, speed, flexibility, proactive perspective, and political
insulation needed to ensure that regulatory programs are designed and
implemented most effectively. Congress, in comparison, is poorly suited
institutionally for the task of detailed rulemaking and program
administration.
Congress is also an overtly political institution which does not pretend
to have the scientific or technical expertise of agencies established to per-
form regulatory functions. When issues are brought before Congress, dis-
agreements quickly become political, and sensible environmental policy
may be lost in the process.1" Technical judgments arrived at through
political compromise may lack a sound scientific foundation, with results
that neither side can anticipate. Science becomes a political tool rather
than a key to difficult technical judgments about how best to protect the
environment. Even when Congress can summon the necessary expertise
for effective decisionmaking on technical issues, it is questionable whether
such expertise, once summoned, can survive the political process of
legislating.
Because of the need for political accommodation and consensus
building, the legislative process is typically slow. With a great number of
complex problems competing for congressional attention, only the most
urgent decisions are made by statute. As the RCRA and CERCLA exper-
iences illustrate, it often takes years for Congress to address perceived
problems, even when the problems at issue have clear public importance.
Detailed statutes lack the flexibility provided by agency rules. The
rulemaking process allows the agencies to modify the rules in response to
122. For one observer's example of how Congressional politics may lead a statute to represent
political trade-offs between interest groups more than a unified attempt to resolve a national problem,
see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 55 (1981) (discussing a tie between
passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments and the Panama Canal Treaty).
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changes in technology and problems encountered in implementation.
Agencies can be relatively responsive to the needs of both the regulated
parties and the beneficiaries of the regulation. In contrast, if a detailed
requirement is contained in the statute itself, the proponents of modifying
the requirement must overcome the inertia and limited attention span of
Congress to get relief. As a result, a congressionally-regulated program is
likely to be characterized by long periods of stagnation, infrequently bro-
ken by sweeping changes.
Not only is congressional action subject to delay, but it is also reactive
in nature. Congress responds best to the "squeaky wheel" and has tradi-
tionally resolved immediate problems more effectively than it has set out
careful plans for future regulatory implementation. The time, resources,
and political insulation needed to construct a long-term and complex regu-
latory system are not available to a legislative body. 2 The administrative
agencies have traditionally managed the complex interrelationships
between the various parts of a regulatory system to maximize effectiveness
and minimize sudden shifts in regulatory policy. Given all of the above-
mentioned institutional limitations on Congress, the interest of the public
is probably best served by Congress' customary reluctance to immerse
itself in the details of implementation.
C. A Generalized.Approach to Congressional Intervention
The experience with the RCRA and CERCLA reauthorizations sug-
gests the importance of several factors in determining when Congress
should set aside its usual role and delve into the detailed policy and imple-
mentation questions normally left to the discretion of the agencies. First,
Congress should not use statutory cures to the problem of an uncoopera-
tive agency if less drastic alternatives might be effective. If the discipline
provided by oversight, budget control, and private party litigation do not
achieve the desired result, Congress should weigh the disadvantages of
statutory rulemaking against the benefits of correcting the malfeasance or
nonfeasance of the regulatory agency.
Where the alternative mechanisms for influencing agency implementa-
tion fail, Congress must face the issue of recalcitrant agencies head on.
Several factors should guide the congressional decision on how to proceed.
First, if the subject of regulation is technically complex and responsible
123. In fact, when the legislature has attempted to lay out specific regulatory strategies in the
past, some critics believe it has forced the agencies into promulgating unrealistic regulations against
their better judgment and capabilities. See Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 321 (Wilson ed. 1980).
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judgment requires understanding of specialized fields, the involvement of
an agency is preferable.
Second, in areas where the population of regulated parties is large and
diverse, the staff and flexibility of an administrative agency are valuable
in tailoring regulations to respond to individual situations. The blunt
instrument of legislation is less well suited to handling variations over
time or among the regulated parties.
Third, Congress should consider its suitability to perform the actions
required to correct perceived agency wrongdoing. Congress is better able
to step into the void created by agency inaction if the agency's tasks are
primarily rulemaking rather than administration. For example, Congress
could reasonably establish pollutant limits by statute, but it has no effec-
tive means for hiring staff, receiving and evaluating bids, and letting con-
tracts for the remedial cleanup work at Superfund sites.
Fourth, Congress should consider the significance of the public harm
resulting from the executive agency's unresponsiveness. In the case of haz-
ardous waste regulation, where the risks to the public created by failure to
implement the statute as desired by Congress are potentially great, there
is increased justification for congressional intervention.
Though all these factors are important, the most significant factor in
any congressional decision to get involved in the implementation of a regu-
latory system is the determination of the agency to resist the intent and
language of the statutory directives. If it becomes clear, as it had in the
RCRA and Superfund programs, that the agency will continue on its
course despite the statute and congressional and other pressure to follow
the law, Congress is essentially left with two choices: step into the regula-
tory role or wait for a change in administration. Congress' choice must
include weighing whether its perception of public needs and preferences
argues for assuming the role of regulator abandoned by the agency. In the
case of hazardous waste policy, where the risks to the public are signifi-
cant, the choice was clear. The drawbacks of detailed statutory regulation
can be weighed abstractly against the benefits, but the ultimate choice is to
abandon protection of the environment or to involve Congress in the diffi-
cult details. In the long run, the best hope may be that the system will
return to equilibrium with Congress setting goals and the agencies imple-
menting them. In the short run, it is likely that specific congressional
directives will increase rather than decrease. Similar to the RCRA and
Superfund experience, in other areas of regulation the dogmatic insistence
on minimizing the role of the federal government has also led to additional
confrontation with Congress. Once again, the only satisfactory response
has been for Congresss to increase its participation in the more technical
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aspects of regulation.12 4 When Congress, supported by public opinion, sets
out a policy through which the federal government must act, the adminis-
trative enforcement arm must carry out its congressional mandate. If the
philosophical opposition of the Administration weakens traditional
enforcement and implementation roles, then Congress must amend stat-
utes to restrict the extent of agency discretion. Only in this way can Con-
gress ensure that the public's desire for a clean environment will be given
effect.
Conclusion
Congressional attempts to mandate a regulatory system for environmen-
tal policy have just begun, and, although the immediate result has been to
improve the control of hazardous waste disposal practices, the ultimate
impact on the regulatory process is still unknown. Complex and costly
scientific and technical decisions are intricate enough when handled by a
regulatory agency. When these decisions are thrown into the overtly polit-
ical process of legislating, sensible decision-making becomes much more
difficult.
The shift in responsibility for environmental decision-making is the
unfortunate, but inevitable product of an uncompromising political philos-
ophy. Although congressional assumption of EPA's regulatory role has its
shortcomings, its intervention is still preferable to the continued reliance
on an agency uninterested in environmental protection.
124. For example, H.R. 4311, pending in the House and S. 2083, pending in the Senate provide
express and detailed requirements for EPA to address the environmental hazards associated with
asbestos in public schools, an area in which EPA has done very little. In the area of air safety,
Representative Norman Y. Mineta, chairman of the House Aviation Subcommittee, has said that "the
philosophical bent of this administration is to get the government out of everything. . .But safety is
not something you leave to the marketplace to be bartered." CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Nov. 9, 1985,
at 2294.
Vol. 3: 351, 1986
